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CURRENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY-No LIEN ON SHIP FOR NON-ACCEPTANCE OF FREIGHT.-The plain-
tiff chartered the Saigon Marit from the defendant. Her captain refused to
accept a full load, and the plaintiff libelled the vessel. Held, that an action in
rem could not be maintained for non-acceptance of freight. Osaka Shosen
Kaisha v. Pacific Export Lumber Co. (Jan. 2, 1923) U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term,
1922, No. 129.
The cargo owner's admiralty "privilege" or lien is not dependent upon posses-
sion. It is a right in renm giving a power to proceed "against the ship" to
recover damages. See The Yankee Blade (1856, U. S.) 19 How. 82; NOTES
(915) 15 COL. L. REV. 343. The lien of the shipowner, being a privilege to
detain, is inseparably associated with possession. See The Eddy (1866, U. S.) 5
Wall. 481. But the liens of the shipowner and the cargo owner are reciprocal,
and the lien of the latter upon the ship does not arise until the lien of the former
upon the cargo has attached. See The Lady Franklin (1869, U. S.) 8 Wall. 325;
The Keokuk (187o, U. S.) 9 Wall. 517. Accordingly, while an affreightment
contract is entirely executory, neither vessel nor cargo is generally held subject
to such lien as can be enforced by a libel in ren. See The Freeman (1856, U. S.)
18 How. 182; The Yankee Blade, supra. In the instant case, this principle is
applied to the unaccepted portion of the freight. The Thomas P. Sheldon (19o2,
D. R. I.) 113 Fed. 779.
ADVERSE PossEssIoN-TENANcY INT CoMMoN-ExPRESs OusTEI-For a writ of
entry by one co-tenant against another the defendant pleaded title by adverse
possession. Held, that proof of exclusive possession for the statutory period
did not establish such a defense, although within the period the defendant had
paid taxes assessed in his name and had occasionally leased the premises. Smith
v. Libby (I922, Me.) 119 Atl. 195.
To acquire title to land by adverse possession, a co-tenant must prove an
ouster of his fellow tenants by showing notorious and unequivocal acts of
exclusive ownership, continuing for the statutory period. Hover v. Hills (1922,
Pa.) 117 Atl. 346; I Tiffany, Real Property (192o) 672. Payment of taxes
assessed in the name of the claimant, though coupled with exclusive possession, is
usually considered of little significance. Schoowmaker v. Schoonmaker (1911)
154 Iowa, 500, 133 N. W. 741; Humphrey v. Seale (1921, Miss.) 87 So. 446.
BANKRUrTcY-TITLE OF TRUSTEE-RIGHT TO RECOVER GAMING LossEs.-A
trustee in bankruptcy sued under a statute, (1835) 5 & 6 Win. IV c. 41, secs. I, 2,
to recover sums paid by check to the defendant bookmaker for betting losses.
Held, that the plaintiff could recover. Scrarton!s Trustee v. Pearse (1922, C. A.)
127 L. T. R. 698.
In England a trustee in bankruptcy, being an officer of the court, is held to a
higher ethical standard than the ordinary plaintiff. Thus he is not permitted to
retain money paid under mistake of law. Ex parte Jamws (1874) L. R. 9 Ch. App.
609; see Carpenter v. Southworth (1908, C. C. A. 2d) 165 Fed. 428; Gillig v.
Grant (1897) 23 App. Div. 596, 49 N. Y. Supp. 78. The court refused to extend
this doctrine to a statutory right of action.
BANKS AND BANKING-DUTY OF BANK AS DEPOSITARY OF TRUST FUNDS.-One
E deposited in his personal account, marked "special," checks of a trust fund
made out to himself as trustee. He withdrew the funds for personal purposes.
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The bank was sued for this misappropriation. Held, that the plaintiff could not
recover from the bank. Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co. (923) 234 N. Y. 394,
138 N. E. 33.
For a criticism of the decision of the lower court which was here reversed,
see COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LANW JOURNAL, 377. On another point the instant
decision sustained the lower court, holding that where an executor" of the A
and B estates misappropriated funds from the A estate and used them to replace
in the B estate funds which he had previously diverted from it, the B estate could
not retain the funds. See (1923) 32 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 293. It is regrettable
that this decision was rendered without notice of an earlier case which decided
flatly in favor of the policy of not disturbing such transactions after comple-
tion. Nassau Bank v. National Bank of Newburgh (1899) 159 N. Y. 456, 54
N. E. 66.
CARRIERS-CoNTRUCTION OF STATUTE REGULATING LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE.-
The plaintiff was a passenger on the defendant railway. In alighting from a car,
her dress caught on a bolt and she was thrown down and injured. She then
brought this action to recover damages. A statute provided that in all cases of
personal injury caused by the "running" of the locomotives or cars, there should
be a presumption that the company had been negligent. Fla. Gen. Rev. Sts. 1920,
sec. 4964. Held, (two judges dissenting) that, since the statute applied only
where the injury was caused by a car while in motion, the plaintiff could not
recover. Tampa Electric Co. v. Soule (1922, Fla.) 94 So. 692.
The court construes the word "running" to be narrower in application than
"operation." Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Bishop (19o8) 132 Ga. 71, 63 S. E. 1103.
But a strict construction does not seem unreasonable since the statute in effect
applies the somewhat harsh doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
CONTRACTS-IN PARI Dmcro THEORY NOT APPLIED To ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.-
The defendant attorney, by false representations, induced the plaintiff to entrust
him with a sum of money ostensibly for the suppression of criminal prosecutions.
The plaintiff discovered the fraud and brought a bill in -equity to regain the
money. Held, that the plaintiff could recover. Berman v. Coakley (1923, Mass.)
137 N. E. 667.
Because of the confidential relationship of attorney and client, an attorney
cannot ordinarily claim the benefit of the rule usually applied to parties to an
illegal contract. Ford v. Harrington (1857) i6 N. Y. 285; Belding v. SInythe
(1885) 138 Mass. 530; contra: Schernerhorn v. De Chambrun (1894, C. C. A.
2d) 64 Fed. 195; Roman v. Mali (1875) 42 Md. 513.
EVIDENCE-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE ADMISSI-
BLE.-In a prosecution for violation of the liquor laws, the defendant objected
to the admission of evidence illegally obtained by a police officer. Held, that the
evidence was admissible. Commonwealth v. Wilkins (1923, Mass.) 138 N. E. ii.
The Massachusetts Court, after reviewing and approving its own decisions,
flatly rejects the federal rule as to the admission of evidence illegally obtained.
See COMMENTS (1921) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 518; COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 490; Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and
Seizure (1922) 8 A. B. A. JoUR. 479.
GIFrs-DEPoSIT OF BONDS TO BE DELIVERED AT DONOR's DEATH.-The deceased
enclosed in a sealed package certain negotiable bonds payable to bearer, and after
writing the plaintiff's name thereon handed the package to A with instructions
to deposit it in a safe-deposit box in the deceased's name and after her death
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to deliver them to the plaintiff. She stated that her reason for not delivering
the bonds to the plaintiff at that time was that she might use part or all of them
during her life. A, by mistake, deposited the bonds in a box in her own name
but delivered the keys to the deceased. After the deceased's death the plaintiff
learned for the first time of the transaction, and brought suit against the admin-
istratrix. Held, that she could not recover. Shea v. Crofut (1922, App. Div.)
196 N. Y. Supp. 850.
Delivery to a third person for delivery to the donee at the donor's death con-
stitutes a valid present gift if the donor intends thereby a final disposition of the
property. Innes v. Potter (1915) 130 Minn. 320, 153 N. W. 604; 3 A. L. R. 9o2,
note. But the decision in the instant case was correct. The transaction amounted
to no more than a gift imperfect for lack of delivery and void also as a testa-
mentary disposition because of failure to comply with the Statute of Wills.
For further discussion see (1920) 20 COL. L. Rav. 196; (1920) 18 MICH. L. Rxv.
55o; (1919) 4 MINN. L. RLv. 7o; (1918) 27 YALE LAW Ju NAL_ 956; (i920)
29 ibid. 549.
INJUNCTIONS-VIOLATION OF STATUTE ENJOINED BY ONE WHO INCURS SPECIAL
DAMAGE.-The plaintiff was lawfully engaged in selling electricity in the city
of Fulton. The defendant, without obtaining permission of the Public Service
Commission as required by statute, set up a competing business in the same city.
The plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant. Held, that an injunction should
be granted. Fulton Light, Heat and Power Co. v. Seneca River Power Co.
(1922, N. Y. Sup. Ct) i1 Misc. 729.
What is essentially a public offense and primarily the concern of the state
may be enjoined by a plaintiff who suffers special damage. 5 Fletcher, Corpora-
tions (1918) sec. 3321. The same result is reached in actions by street railway
companies against unlicensed jitney drivers by extending the common-law doc-
trine of public nuisance. See COMMENTS (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 485; but
see Public Service Ry. v. Reinhardt (1921) 9z N. J. Eq. 365, 112 Atl. 850.
MANDAMUS-WRIT TO CoMPEL. TOWN TO LEVY TAx.-The plaintiff Board of
Supervisors, acting under legislative authority, established a drainage district and
included therein certain parts of the defendant incorporated town. Contracts
for improvements having been duly let and completed and the town having
refused to levy a tax to pay the assessment, the plaintiff Board sued out a writ
of mnandamus to compel the levying of such tax. Held, that the plaintiff was
entitled to the writ. Board of Supervisors of Humboldt County v. Dakota City
(1922, Iowa) 191 N. W. 69.
The action was maintained by virtue of a statute permitting ahy citizen whether
directly interested or not to be a relator when the matter concerned is of public
interest. Iowa Ann. Code, 1897, sec. 4345. A similar result is now reached in
a majority of jurisdictions, even in the absence of statute. See Brewster v.
Sherman (i9o7) 195 Mass. 222, 8o N. E. 821; II Ann. Cas. 419, note; (192o)
6 VA. L. REV. 205. For further discussion of mandamus, see (915) 63 U. PA.
L. REV. 575; (I916) 64 ibid. 406; (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOtmRNAL, 554; (1923)
32 ibid. 5o3.
PERSoNs-ADoPTIoN-CHnII'S WELFARE TE DErERMINING FACTOR IN A OON-
FLICT OF RIGHTS.-The defendant, a loose woman, left her infant child in the
custody of the petitioner, a reputable person. Two years later, the mother, still
a profligate, refused to sign adoption papers. The petitioner instituted adoption
proceedings. Held, that the adoption should be permitted. In the Matter of
Miller (1922, N. Y. Co. Ct.) 119 Misc. 638.
In balancing the impaired rights of a neglectful parent against the acqured
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rights of a benevolent custodian, the courts make the child's interest paramount.
Kurtz v. Christensen (1922, Utah) 2og Pac. 34o; Richards v. Collins (1889)
45 N. J. Eq. 283, 17 Atl. 831; Hickey v. Thayer (1911) 85 Kan. 556, 118 Pac. 56.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES-RESIDENcE OF PARTIEs-SUIT BROUGHT IN COURT OF
STATE OF WHICH NEITHER PARTY Is INHABITANT.-The plaintiff, a citizen of
Texas, was injured in Kentucky while traveling on the railroad of the defendant,
a Virginia corporation. He brought suit in a state court of Kentucky. The
defendant removed the cause of the federal district court and the plaintiff moved
to remand, on the ground that the district court was without jurisdiction in that
neither party was a resident of that district. Held, that the cause was properly
removed. Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. (Jan. 22, 1923) U. S. Sup. Ct Oct.
Term, 1922, No. 422.
The instant case settles a much disputed question. (1917) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 567, 96O; (1918) 28 ibid. 294. The court expressly overrules an earlier
Supreme Court decision. Ex parte Wisner (19o6) 203 U. S. 449, 27 Sup. Ct.
15o; see COMMENTS (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 935.
TRUSTS-PRIVILEGES OF FIDUCIARY-PROFIT FROM DEALINGS WITH CESTtui.-The
defendant, an officer of the plaintiff company, purchased and foreclosed a mort-
gage upon its property. At the sale he bought in the property. An action was
brought to enjoin the issuance of a sheriff's deed under the foreclosure sale.
Held, that the defendant had become a trustee for the company subject to a lien
for his expenses. White Earth Creamery Co. v. Edwardson (1922, N. D.) 191
N. W. 622.
In order to relieve from execution the property of the defendant company, one
Stover, an officer and promoter thereof, in his individual capacity, bought in a
judgment against it. One of the promoters and stockholders who had paid a
proportionate share of the liability under the judgment sued Stover and the
company to recover such proportionate payment. Held, that he could not recover.
O'Keefe v. Eclipse Pocahontas Coal Co. (1923, W. Va.) 115 S. E. 579.
A trustee is forbidden to make a profit from his fiduciary position irrespective
of good faith. (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 192; Frost, Rights of Trustees
to Derive Indirect Profits (1918) 52 Am. L. Rev. 895. The surety on the bond
of a guardian who had the express permission of the court to borrow funds
from his ward's estate has been held responsible for their loss. Sowers v.
Pollock (1923, Kan.) 212 Pac. 103. The instant cases are not in conflict and are
correct. In the first the fiduciary is denied his profit; in the second his act
assisted the company, and he himself neither obtained nor sought profit, but
was entitled to indemnity.
TRUSTs-REvocATioN BY SOLE BENEFICIARY.-A transferred personal property
to T upon trust for A's sole benefit. No third party had any interest in the
property, vested or contingent. A gave T written notice of a revocation of the
trust. A's heirs objected and T, desiring to be neutral, filed this bill for instruc-
tions of the court. Held, that being the sole beneficiary, the settlor could revoke
it at will. Phelps v. Thompson et al. (1922, Sup. Ct) 119 Misc. 875.
It is well settled that a trust, once validly created, whether by a simple declara-
tion or transfer in trust, cannot be revoked by the settlor unless a power of revoca-
tion is reserved. Scott, Cases on Trusts (1919) 817, note I. It may be revoked
by consent of all the cestuis if no power of revocation is reserved. N. Y. Cons.
Laws, 1909, ch. 45, sec. 23; Perry, Trusts (6th ed. 1911) sec lo4; (1916) 4
CALIF. L. REV. 354; (1915) 63 U. PA. L. REv. 816.
